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Abstract
In many perceptual and cognitive decision-making problems, humans sample multiple noisy information sources serially,
and integrate the sampled information to make an overall decision. We derive the optimal decision procedure for two-
alternative choice tasks in which the different options are sampled one at a time, sources vary in the quality of the
information they provide, and the available time is fixed. To maximize accuracy, the optimal observer allocates time to
sampling different information sources in proportion to their noise levels. We tested human observers in a corresponding
perceptual decision-making task. Observers compared the direction of two random dot motion patterns that were triggered
only when fixated. Observers allocated more time to the noisier pattern, in a manner that correlated with their sensory
uncertainty about the direction of the patterns. There were several differences between the optimal observer predictions
and human behaviour. These differences point to a number of other factors, beyond the quality of the currently available
sources of information, that influences the sampling strategy.
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Introduction
In humans and many other biological organisms, the sensory
and cognitive machinery used to pick up and process information
from the environment is extremely limited. For the human visual
system, high resolution vision is only possible in the small part of
the visual scene that projects onto the fovea. As a result, we sample
information selectively and sequentially from the visual world by
frequently shifting the line of sight [1]. We are often presented
with perceptual decision problems which involve sampling
information from multiple sources and then using that information
to make an overall judgement about the ‘‘state of the world’’. For
example, when crossing a road, we must integrate information
from either direction, sampled in serial, to decide whether it is safe
to cross.
Sensory information is typically noisy, and therefore uncertain
[2,3]. The level of uncertainty may vary across different
information sources (e.g., the view of the road in one direction
may be obstructed by a tree). In different situations (e.g., familiar
versus unfamiliar junctions) we may have different amounts of
prior knowledge of such variations in information quality. Internal
processing mechanisms in the brain will insert additional noise
[4,5]. Switching between information sources incurs a temporal
cost, in the form of reduced visual sensitivity for a period during
and around the movement from one source to another [6–8]. A
central challenge in such decision problems is to allocate a limited
amount of time appropriately to different sources of information
that can only be sampled one at a time.
Much of the work on perceptual decision-making involves
observers (humans or non-human primates) making a binary
decision about a single stimulus [9,10]. For instance, observers
may view a noisy pattern and make a decision about the average
direction of motion of the pattern (typically either to the left or
right). In such tasks it has been observed that certain neurons in
frontal and parietal areas integrate information from sensory areas
that encode the evidence for alternative choices [11,12]. It has
been proposed [13–16] that these neural circuits implement the
computation described by the diffusion model (Figure 1a) [17].
This model assumes that the brain computes a decision variable
that corresponds to the integrated difference between inputs from
sensory neurons selective for the two alternatives. The diffusion
model has been shown, under certain assumptions, to be the
continuum limit of sequentially computing the ratio of the
likelihoods of the two alternatives [18], which can be used to
form optimal decisions in fixed time and free-response decision
problems [19,20].
Recently, a modification of the diffusion model has been
proposed which mechanistically describes choice process between
two options that are inspected serially [21] (Figure 1b). In this
modified diffusion model, the average rate of change of the
decision variable depends on which option is currently sampled
(i.e. fixated). In line with the predictions of the model, it was
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e78993
observed that the cumulative length of visual fixations on each
target influenced the outcome of the decision process, with choices
biased towards the option that had been viewed for longer.
In this paper, we consider a comparative decision problem in
which multiple sources of information have to be sampled
sequentially, in a fixed period of time, to make a two-alternative
forced choice decision. Critically, we consider the situation in
which different sources of information have different levels of
noise. Our specific aims are threefold. First, given the novelty of
the decision problem under investigation, we identified the
optimal sampling strategy that maximises accuracy in this type
of situation. Second, we developed an experimental paradigm
that extends the classic perceptual decision-making task
described above to this more challenging situation. We assessed
how human sampling behaviour compares to the qualitative
predictions generated by the ideal observer. Third, we
examined the relation between the normative model developed
below and the fixation-dependent drift diffusion model that has
been applied to the specific instance of comparative choice
described above [21].
Results
Optimal observer
As with previous two-alternative perceptual decision studies
[9,10], we assume that evidence for each alternative is encoded in
the firing rates of neurons responding to the visual stimuli. As in
previous studies [13,14], for simplicity we assume that the average
firing rate of a population of neurons selective for a particular
stimulus has a normal distribution across different time intervals
during which a given stimulus is presented. This assumption can
be made because the firing rate of a neural population within an
interval is an average of the rates of many individual neurons and,
according to the central limit theorem, can be approximated by a
normal distribution. We assume these firing rates are integrated
until the available time has elapsed and the decision is determined
by the state of the integrated decision variable (Figure 1). For the
ideal observer we treat the firing rate of the neurons responding to
a given visual stimulus as an independent normally distributed
random variable, which we denote by X*N(mx,s
2
x) and
Y*N(my,s
2
y) for each of the two information sources. The mean
firing rates, mx and my, are assumed to be linked to the strength of
evidence for each alternative. Finally, we denote the samples
drawn from X and Y by x1    xm and y1    yn respectively,
where m and n denote the numbers of samples obtained from X
and Y.
We assume that one source of information will evoke a greater
response in terms of average firing rate than the other. A
comparative decision can be formulated as a decision between two
hypotheses, Hx and Hy which are shown below:
Hx : mx~hzd my~h{d
Hy : mx~h{d my~hzd:
ð1Þ
Hx is the hypothesis that the sampled evidence supporting
alternative X outweighs that supporting alternative Y and Hy is
the hypothesis that the sampled evidence supporting alternative Y
outweighs that supporting alternative X . We assume that the
observer has learned the relative difference between the two
sources, which we denote by: 2d~ mx{my
 . In the context of the
experimental work reported below, it seems reasonable that
observers would acquire this knowledge after experiencing a
number of trials. Importantly, we assume that the observer does not
know the average of the means of the two sources which we denote
by h. Thus, Equation 1 embodies a comparative decision rule: the
response evoked by one alternative cannot be used to choose
between these two hypotheses (i.e., just ‘‘knowing’’ the mean value
of one source is not sufficient).
Figure 1. Models of the decision process for two different two-alternative decision problems. (a) Decision model for a single source two-
alternative forced choice decision. A frequently used stimulus in such tasks is the random dot kinematogram (RDK), which consists of a number of
dots, only some of which move in a particular ‘‘signal’’ direction. Subjects are typically asked to decide in which of two directions the RDK is moving.
With a single source of visual information the sensory data provide evidence for both alternatives. In motion discrimination tasks this evidence comes
from neurons in area MT whose activity (firing rate) is tuned to respond to motion in a particular direction. At each moment in time, evidence from
two populations of neurons is used to update a single decision variable. (b) Decision model proposed by Krajbich et al. [18] for a comparative two-
alternative decision problem with two sources of visual stimuli. In their study, participants were asked to choose between two food items presented
simultaneously in different locations on the screen. With each stimulus providing evidence about one particular alternative, the decision variable is no
longer updated simultaneously by evidence for all available targets. Instead, as a target is fixated (target X in (b)) evidence supporting that target is
generated and incorporated into the decision variable. During this time, the mechanisms that represent the evidence for the non-fixated target
remain silent (shaded out branch for target Y in (b)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g001
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Deciding which hypothesis to select on the basis of the available
evidence can be performed optimally using a log-likelihood ratio
test which compares the value of the log-likelihood ratio, denoted
z, to some problem dependent decision criterion g, withHx chosen
when above the criterion and Hy chosen otherwise. In the
case where both hypotheses are equally likely with
P Hxð Þ~P Hy
 
~1=2 the optimal decision criterion is g~0 and
the sign of z determines the hypothesis to select with X chosen
when zw0 and Y chosen when zv0. The log-likelihood ratio for
the above problem was derived by Hayre and Gittins [22] (see
Materials S1 for full derivation). The derivation is long and
complicated because Hayre and Gittins avoided making any
assumption about the unknown parameter h. However, the same
value of the log-likelihood ratio can be easily obtained in a special
case where one assumes that all values of h are equally likely. We
outline this simplified derivation below. Assuming that h has a
uniform distribution on the interval between 2B and B, the
likelihood of observed samples given hypothesis Hx is equal to:
P(x1,:::,xm,y1,:::,ynjHx)
~
ðB
{B
1
2B
P(x1,:::,xm,y1,:::,ynjHx,h)dh
~
ðB
{B
C
2B
exp {
Pm
i~1
xi{h{dð Þ2
2s2x
{
Pn
i~1
yi{hzdð Þ2
2s2y
0BB@
1CCAdh:
ð2Þ
where C~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
sx
 {m ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
sy
 {n
. Equation 2 can be rear-
ranged to factor out h:
P(x1,:::,xm,y1,:::,ynDHx)~
~
C
2B
ðB
{B
exp {
m
2s2x
z
n
2s2y
 !
h2z2
Pm
i~1
xi{dð Þ
2s2x
z
Pn
i~1
yizdð Þ
2s2y
0BB@
1CCAh
0BB@
{
Pm
i~1
xi{dð Þ2
2s2x
z
Pn
i~1
yizdð Þ2
2s2y
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1CCA
1CCAdh:
ð3Þ
Assuming that B is large, the above equation can be expressed
without the unknown parameter h using the following identity:
ð?
{?
exp {ah2{2bhzc
 
dh~
ﬃﬃﬃ
p
a
r
exp
b2
a
zc
 
ð4Þ
Expressing the likelihood of samples given Hy in an analogous way
and taking the ratio of the likelihoods, most of the terms cancel
and the log likelihood ratio becomes:
z~Log
P(x1,:::,xm,y1,:::,ynjHx)
P(x1,:::,xm,y1,:::,ynjHy)
~
4dn
ms2yzns
2
x
Xm
i~1
xi{
4dm
ms2yzns
2
x
Xn
i~1
yi:
ð5Þ
According to Equation 5, at each interval in the decision process,
the log-likelihood ratio is dependent on the difference in the
weighted summation of evidence from each alternative.
The weights on the two evidence sums from both alternatives
(ratios before the summation signs in Equation 5) vary as samples
are drawn from either alternative. This variability in the weight
applied to the accumulation of evidence ensures that when one
source of information has yet to be sampled, i.e. either m~0 or
n~0, the log-likelihood ratio remains fixed at its initial value of
z~0. To illustrate this property, the black curve in Figure 2 shows
how z changes during an illustrative comparative decision, in
which positive values indicate a greater amount of evidence for Hx
– please note that the curve remains at 0 until the second source is
sampled.
Optimal sampling allocation
We now consider how to allocate the available time between the
two information sources to maximize the accuracy in decision
tasks with a fixed time limit. The log-likelihood ratio from
Equation 5 may be reformulated in terms of the total sampling
time T~mzn and the portion of this sampling time allocated to
alternative X , which we denote q~m=(mzn). We can then
rewrite Equation 5 as:
z~
4d
qs2yz(1{q)s
2
x
(1{q)
XqT
1
xi{q
X(1{q)T
1
yi
h i
: ð6Þ
Using the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio at decision
time, we can calculate the expected error rate (see Materials S1,
section 2.1) for a given sampling strategy (i.e. value of q):
ER~W {2d
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
q 1{qð ÞT
qs2yz 1{qð Þs2x
s !
: ð7Þ
In Equation 7, W denotes the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. The portion of sampling allocated to
alternative X that minimises the error rate, can be computed by
finding q for which dER/dq=0 (see Materials S1, section 2.2 for
details). We find that, in order to minimize the expected error rate,
the decision maker should divide their sampling time between the
two targets such that
m=n~
sx

sy: ð8Þ
Thus, we can state simply that the optimal allocation strategy is to
allocate the available sampling time between the two sources such
that each one is sampled for a period of time proportional to its
standard deviation. Therefore the ideal observer would spend
longer sampling the less certain (or noisier) source.
Optimal number of switches
The decision problem analysed here requires the observer to
sample both sources of information, necessitating at least one
switch during the course of each trial. Switching frequently entails
an energetic and/or temporal cost. For instance, in the particular
task outlined below observers make saccades between two stimuli,
which results in a period of strongly reduced visual sensitivity
[6,7,8]. In our mathematical framework, switching between
alternatives incurs a temporal cost by reducing the available
sampling time T in proportion to the number of switches.
According to Equation 7, reducing T increases the error rate
(because W is a monotonic function; see Materials S1, section 3 for
further details). Therefore, when observers have advance knowl-
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edge of the noise levels of the two sources of information, the
optimal strategy is to make just the one switch to maximise the
time available for sampling the evidence. Figure 3a illustrates
schematically the optimal allocation when the observer knows the
noise level of both sources in advance.
However, in many natural situations the observers do not know
the noise level of the two sources before sampling them. Without
prior knowledge multiple switches can, under certain circum-
stances, be adaptive. Consider a scenario in which there are just
two possible noise levels (as in our experiment described below).
There are 4 possible combinations of noise level: a low or high
noise first source coupled with a low or high noise second source.
Figure 3b illustrates the optimal allocation when the observer does
not know the noise level of the sources in advance, but only learns
of their quality upon sampling them. When the observer does not
know the noise level of the second source, say sy, while observing
the first, the timing of the first switch cannot depend on sy.
Therefore, the first switch times are the same in the top two cases
in Figure 3b. In Materials S1 (section 4.1) we show that the
optimal time for the first switch when sy is unknown lies in
between the two optimal switch times when sy is known. For
example, the first switch time in the two top cases in Figure 3b lies
between the switch times in the two top cases in Figure 3a. When
the initial switch has been made and the second source has been
sampled, the observer knows the noise level of both patterns. If the
second source is of good quality so that not all the remaining time
is needed to estimate its mean with sufficient precision, the
observer may decide to switch back and collect more information
from the first source (first and third cases in Figure 3b). In
Materials S1 (section 4.2), we further show that the magnitude of
the switching cost influences the extent to which additional
switches can improve accuracy.
Active sampling with gaze
To assess how humans allocate sampling time in this type of
decision problem, we performed an experiment in which observers
Figure 2. Temporal evolution of the log-likelihood ratio (Equation 5 – thick black line). We also show a simplified decision variable
described later in the text (dashed dark grey line; section ‘Fixation-dependent drift diffusion model’ in the Results). The decision variables were
computed on the basis of identical sequences of sensory evidence generated from Gaussian distributions with means mx= 4 and my= 1, and equal
standard deviations sx= sy=2.0. The sampling strategy used for both variables is identical and can be inferred from the background of the figure
with grey indicating alternative X is fixated and white alternative Y, each block of fixation is equally sized. For easier comparison the simplified
decision variable is scaled by c(1-q), where c is the scaling factor in front of square bracket in Equation 6. The simplified decision variable (Equation 10)
in this example assumes time is allocated equally to the two sources (~q~0:5) and the points marked by black circles on the figure indicate the times
when this assumption holds (q~~q).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g002
Figure 3. Illustration of optimal switch times in the (a) known and (b) unknown conditions. Each elongated rectangle represents the total
viewing duration. Segments with two different orientations of patterns represent the epochs spent viewing the two stimuli. High contrast segments
correspond to a low noise source, while low contrast segments correspond to a high noise source. The four rows in each panel correspond to four
possible combinations of noise in the two sources.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g003
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had to judge which of two RDKs translated in a more clockwise
direction. Figure 4 illustrates the paradigm in detail. The
comparative nature of this judgement meant that both sources
of information had to be inspected in order to come to a decision.
The dots moved only when fixated, so that only one pattern could
be sampled at a particular point in time. Compared to the
standard motion discrimination task with just a single source of
evidence, the observer not only had to accumulate evidence from
each individual source in order to estimate its direction of motion,
but also had to decide at each point in time which information
source to sample (i.e., take more samples from the current source
or switch to the other source?).
Eight observers viewed two RDKs, with either low noise (24%
coherence) or high noise (12% coherence) over a period of
1500 ms. Each observer was tested in two conditions (the order of
which was counter-balanced). In the ‘known’ condition the
luminance of the dots accurately mapped onto noise levels (e.g.,
black dots represent 24% coherence, while white dots represent
12% coherence). Since participants could see luminance of the
dots before motion onset, they had a perfectly reliable cue to the
quality of both patterns before actively sampling them. In the
‘unknown’ condition, the luminance of the RDKs was assigned
randomly from trial-to-trial.
The optimal observer model developed above makes the
following three main predictions for this task: (i) On the trials in
which the two patterns had different levels of coherence, the
participants should spend more time looking at the noisier
stimulus. (ii) The ratio of durations spent looking at the two
stimuli should be equal to the ratio of noise levels in the stimuli. (iii)
Participants should produce more switches in the unknown than
the known condition, in particular when the second stimulus they
sample has a high coherence. In the next section we briefly report
the accuracy of participants. In the following three sections we
compare the above predictions with the experimental data, and
report other effects present in the data that were not predicted by
the model.
Perceptual performance
Table 1 shows the behavioural performance data (discrimina-
tion accuracy) as a function of the noise in the two information
sources, for both levels of prior knowledge. Accuracy averaged
across observers ranged from 70% correct (for two low coherence
patterns) to 84% (for two high coherence patterns). Performance in
conditions with one high and one low coherence pattern, was in
between the two extremes, at 76% correct. We combined the data
from the two mixed coherence conditions and ran a 362 repeated
Figure 4. The trial sequences of the presented experiments. (a) Comparative two-alternative forced choice decision task. During each trial
observers are presented with two stationary RDKs with centres located above and below the centre point of the screen on the vertical axis. The
activation of the RDKs was gaze contingent, with a given RDK activated once the observer’s gaze fell within the appropriate region of the display. The
task was to identify the target pattern: the one whose signal direction was further clockwise through the short angle. RDKs could consist of either
black or white dots in both the full and no prior knowledge conditions but the conditions differed in whether the dot polarity was linked to a noise
level. A trial started with a preview period of 1000 ms in which observers could process the polarity of the patterns and were instructed by an arrow
(appearing 500 ms after trial onset) which pattern to view first. Following the preview, they were free to actively sample the patterns over a period of
1500 ms and subsequently gave their response once both RDKs were extinguished. They were instructed that they must look at each pattern at least
once in the course of a trial but other than that, they could switch between patterns in any way they wanted. The figure shows a trial in which the
observer was instructed to view the upper pattern first and made only one switch. The eye indicates the vertical eye position, the hatched arrows the
signal direction of motion of the moving pattern. The figure is not to scale. (b) Single pattern direction estimation task. Observers viewed a single
pattern between 75 and 1000 ms. Once the RDK had offset, they indicated their estimate of the signal direction by moving an arrow to this direction
with a mouse and clicking.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g004
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measures ANOVA with pattern coherence (low – mixed – high)
and prior knowledge (known – unknown) as factors. The variation
in coherence between the patterns was clearly sufficient to
generate variations in discrimination accuracy: there was a main
effect of pattern coherence, F(2, 14) = 39.87, p,.001. Prior
knowledge did not affect discrimination accuracy, F(1, 7) = 1.17,
p= .32, nor did it interact with coherence, F(2, 14) = 0.53, p= .60.
Gaze time
To test whether participants spent longer sampling the noisier
pattern, we computed the total amount of time spent looking at the
pattern that was cued first, GT1. This time includes re-fixations on
trials in which observers switched more than once. This gaze time
measure is appropriate because the overall presentation time was
fixed at 1.5 s, so that the gaze time on the two patterns was not
independent: the longer the observer sampled pattern 1, the less
time was available for pattern 2 and vice versa. By only taking the
gaze time on the first pattern, we ensured that our outcome
variable was independent across the different conditions. We
converted gaze time into a proportion of the overall sampling time:
GT1
GT1zGT2
. Note that the available sampling time was less than the
presentation time due to (i) the latency of the initial saccade to the
first pattern, and (ii) the movement time associated with switches
from one pattern to another. The former introduced only a
minimal delay of 14 ms (average of mean latency across
observers), because the interval between cue onset and start of
the test period was held constant. As a result, observers frequently
anticipated the offset of the cue (start of the test period) and, on
average, fixated the first pattern around the time of cue offset. The
average saccade duration was ,50 ms, which is a lower bound on
the switch cost (pre- and post-saccadic suppression would prolong
this period). For each observer, the proportion of time spent on the
first pattern was averaged across trials in a given experimental
condition.
Figure 5a shows the sampling allocation for all trials, regardless
of the accuracy of the perceptual decision (average of the subject
means). Clearly the coherence of the first pattern had a substantial
effect on the time it was viewed, with a low coherence pattern
being viewed considerably longer than a high coherence pattern,
F(1,7) = 38.1, p,.001. This effect would be expected if observers
simply sampled the first pattern until (s)he felt sufficiently certain
about the direction of that pattern, and then spent the remaining
time in the trial sampling the second pattern. A more critical and
interesting aspect of sampling behaviour is whether the amount of
time spent on the first pattern depends on the coherence of the
second pattern. The data in Figure 5a do indeed show a modulation
of gaze time by the noise level of the second pattern. When the
second pattern coherence was high, more time was spent on the
first pattern, F(1,7) = 9.35, p= .02, as predicted by the model. It
is worth noting that the effect of first pattern coherence was
larger than that of second pattern coherence, a form of hyper-
sensitivity to the first source of information encountered. As a
consequence of this hyper-sensitivity, one model prediction is
obviously incorrect: when the two patterns have the same
coherence, the amount of time allocated to the patterns should
be equal (and half the available time). However, observers
viewed the low coherence first pattern longer than a high
coherence first pattern, even when they had a perfectly reliable
cue telling them that the second pattern had the same coherence
(i.e. in the known condition).
When prior knowledge about the noise levels of the two
information sources is available, observers have the opportunity to
adjust the time spent sampling the first pattern depending on the
quality of the second pattern already on the first fixation. When no
prior information is available, the quality of the second pattern is
only known once the observer has started sampling it. As such, we
might expect a stronger effect of the second pattern coherence
when prior knowledge is available. Indeed, there was a significant
interaction between the level of knowledge (known vs unknown)
and the second coherence, F(1,7) = 21.67, p= .002. Evidently,
observers used prior information to adjust their sampling
allocation (see also Figure 5c and text below)
In the remaining panels of Figure 5, we demonstrate the pattern
of sampling allocation contingent upon the accuracy of the
perceptual decision (5b) and the number of switches between the
two sources of information (5c). In Figure 5b we pooled the data
across the different noise levels of the first pattern, but split the
data depending on the accuracy of the perceptual decision. The
most salient aspect of this plot is that on error trials, gaze was fixed
longer on the first pattern compared to correct trials. It is possible
that observers were more likely to make an error if they switched
too late from the first source and did not leave sufficient time for
the analysis of the second pattern. Alternatively, it may be that,
due to the stochastic nature of the stimulus, on some trials the first
pattern happened to be more difficult to encode. The greater
difficulty would increase the probability of an error decision, with
subjects (appropriately) spending longer on the difficult first
pattern. We cannot distinguish between these alternative expla-
nations with the current data set.
In Figure 5c we again pooled across the different noise levels of
the first pattern, and included both correct and error trials, but
split the data on the basis of switching frequency. It is
immediately obvious that observers spent more time on the
first pattern when they switched more than once. Indeed, of the
multiple switch trials, the majority of trials (,75%) were those
in which observers switched back to the first pattern and stayed
there until the end of the trial. Another obvious effect is that
when observers switched only once, the coherence of the second
pattern could not influence the time spent on the first pattern in
the unknown condition (solid grey line). In the known condition,
however, the coherence of the second pattern influenced the
fixation duration on the first pattern on single switch trials (solid
black line), again underlining the use of prior information by our
observers. Finally, it is worth pointing out that when observers
switched only once, they allocated time nearly equally to both
sources of information, suggesting that observers had an
accurate representation of the overall amount of time available
and used this knowledge to adjust the timing of a single switch.
Indeed, for these trials, observers spent less than half the
available time on a high coherence first pattern; when the first
pattern had a low coherence, observers spent more than half the
available time on that source (data not shown).
Table 1. Discrimination accuracy for the different
combinations of pattern noise and prior knowledge.
pattern 2 coherence
known unknown
low high low high
pattern 1 coherence Low 0.7 0.76 0.71 0.78
High 0.76 0.83 0.76 0.85
Values are proportion correct averaged over 8 observers. The within-subject
standard error of the mean was 0.01 in all eight conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.t001
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Sensory variability and gaze time
To test the second, quantitative prediction on the dependence of
gaze time on the pattern noise levels, we would need to know the
standard deviations of the evidence generated by the two sources
of information (the sx and sy in Equation 8 above). However, the
nature of the RDK stimulus is such that we cannot directly map
coherence onto estimates of the variability of the information
sources. All the observer can know about sx and sy is based on the
precision of his/her own direction estimates: a low coherence
patch will generally elicit less precise direction estimates compared
to a high coherence patch. A complicating factor is that the
precision of an observer’s direction estimate will depend not just
on the external noise in the stimulus, but also on the intrinsic noise
of the neural mechanisms that are involved in processing that
stimulus [24]. Nevertheless, we took the view that internal noise
could not have been so large as to completely swamp the influence
of the external noise on the observers’ direction estimates;
otherwise, discrimination performance would have been equal in
the conditions with two low or two high coherence patterns (see
Table 1). As such, it is informative to examine whether and to
what extent the allocation of gaze time could be predicted from the
directional (un)certainty.
To measure directional uncertainty, observers were shown a
single low or high noise pattern and were asked to indicate the
direction of coherent motion by rotating a dial with the mouse
cursor. The true motion direction was uniformly sampled around
the clock in integer intervals. For each direction judgement, we
calculated the difference between the actual and perceived
direction, with a positive sign given to clockwise deviations. Across
a number of repetitions at a given coherence, we calculated the
circular standard deviation (angular deviation in [25]). We
estimated the variability in this way for a number of different
viewing durations (see Methods; data not shown), but for the
purpose of the present analysis we selected a viewing duration of
750 ms as the one that came closest to average gaze time on
pattern 1. Figure 6a shows these standard deviation estimates for
each individual observer and for the two different levels of
coherence. As expected, uncertainty was much greater for the low
coherence pattern compared to the high coherence pattern for
every individual observer. These variability estimates served as
proxies for the generative sx and sy in the following analysis.
The model prediction given by Equation 8 is straightforward:
the ratio of sampling time allocated to the two patterns should
match the ratio of the standard deviation of the evidence provided
by the two patterns. Of particular interest are of course the trials in
which the quality of the two information sources differed. We
selected only these trials and computed the ratio of the gaze time
on the low coherence pattern (in low – high coherence trials) to the
gaze time on the high coherence pattern (in high – low coherence
trials). In this way, we ensured that the gaze time estimates that
make up the ratio were independent. Figure 6b plots the low/high
coherence gaze time ratio against the low/high coherence ratio of
the perceptual direction judgements, separately for the two levels
of prior knowledge.
Several features are noteworthy. First, all the data lie below the
identity line (thin grey line), indicating that gaze time was much
less differentiated than the sensory noise would dictate. The
existence of internal noise does not explain this departure from the
model prediction: internal noise – more specifically stimulus-
independent internal noise – would push the ratio of the sensory
variability closer to one (effectively adding a constant to the
squared numerator and denominator on the right side of Equation
8). In other words, for a noiseless observer limited only by the
external noise in the stimulus, the data points would lie even
further to the right. Second, the gaze time ratio was consistently
lower in the unknown condition compared to the known condition
(in 7/8 observers). This finding underlines that prior knowledge
allowed for a stronger dependence of the sampling strategy on the
quality of the information sources, as already shown above
(Figure 5). Third, while the strong identity prediction of the model
did not hold, there clearly was a strong relation between the
precision of the direction estimates and gaze time. The thick black
line corresponds to the regression line derived from all the data
(averaged across known and unknown conditions). The slope is
Figure 5. Sampling allocation as measured by the gaze time on the first pattern. Gaze time on the first pattern includes all re-fixations and
is expressed as a proportion of the overall gaze time on both patterns. In other words, this variable corresponds to the proportion of available
sampling time (excluding the initial saccade latency and the duration of any subsequent movements) spent on the pattern that was cued first. Data
are averaged over eight observers and the error bars display within-subject standard error [23]. (a) Gaze time contingent on the coherence of the first
and second patterns. (b) Gaze time contingent on the accuracy of the perceptual decision. (c) Gaze time contingent on the number of switches.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g005
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significantly greater than 0 (p= .04) and explains over half the
variance, R2 = .55.
Figure 6c shows the relation between sensory variability and
gaze time contingent upon the number of switches made by the
observer (pooled across prior knowledge). The thick black line is
the same regression function from panel b, based on all the data
taken together. The regression line is closer to the single switch
trial data for the simple reason that these represent the majority of
the trials. However, it is notable that the multiple switch trial data
points consistently lie below the single switch observations (for all 8
observers). That is, gaze time was less sensitive to the quality of the
information when observers switched more than once. One
possible explanation is that additional switches may be triggered if
on some trials observers fail to adapt their very first fixation to the
quality of the information. On such trials, any difference in the
gaze times on low and high coherence first patterns may only be
engendered during the third fixation (or any subsequent fixations
on the first pattern), for which much less time is available.
Inevitably then, the gaze time ratio will be closer to unity.
Switching Frequency
Finally, we turn to a description of observers’ switching
behaviour. Recall the strong model prediction that observers
should switch only once in the known condition. It may be
beneficial to switch more than once in the unknown condition,
when the second pattern had a high coherence. Figure 7 shows the
proportion of single switch trials. Clearly, observers did regularly
switch more than once, even when prior knowledge was available
about the quality of the two sources, which is inconsistent with the
prediction of the model. The negatively sloping lines indicate a
dependence of the switching frequency on the coherence of the
second pattern. That is, observers were more likely to switch more
than once when the coherence of the second pattern was high,
F(1,7) = 10.9, p= .01. This result is in line with the prediction of
the model. There was an interaction between prior knowledge and
second pattern coherence, F(1,7) = 7.93, p= .03. Figure 7 suggests
that this interaction is due to an increased propensity to make only
a single switch when prior knowledge was available and the second
pattern had a low coherence. It is tempting to speculate that when
prior knowledge was available, observers were better able to
optimise a single switch point. Setting an appropriate switch point
may be especially important when the quality of the second source
is relatively poor. Arguably, however, choosing the right switch
point is most important when both patterns have a low coherence.
There is no evidence that observers made fewest switches on these
particular trials.
Fixation-dependent drift diffusion model
In the Introduction, we noted the recent development of a
model to account for decision-making in a specific instance of the
more general decision problem we have considered in this article
[21]. Krajbich and colleagues studied choice between two
consumer products, which were inspected sequentially. The two
options were assumed to have equal noise and the decisions were
terminated by the observers themselves, rather than after a fixed
period of time. Given the obvious relation to the more general
problem considered here, we examined the relation between their
model and the ideal observer developed in this study.
We start by simplifying the decision variable described in
Equation 6. As explained before, in tasks with fixed time available
Figure 6. Sensory uncertainty estimates and their relation to gaze time. (a) Standard deviation of the angular errors (angular deviation
metric; see Methods for details) in the single pattern direction estimation task. Patterns were viewed for 750 ms (close to the average gaze time on
the first pattern in the main experiment). (b) Gaze time ratio of low and high coherence first patterns (from trials in which the coherence of the two
patterns differed) versus the ratio of the standard deviation of the single pattern direction estimates. Data are shown separately for known and
unknown conditions (N=8 in both conditions). The thick black line shows linear regression on the data averaged across the two levels of prior
knowledge. The thin grey line shows the identity correspondence. (c) Same as panel b, but with the gaze time data pooled across prior knowledge
and split depending on the number of switches. The thick black line shows the same regression as in (b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g006
Figure 7. The proportion of trials on which a single switch
between the RDKs occurred. Data are averaged over 8 observers.
The error bars display within-subject standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078993.g007
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to form a decision and a prior assumption that both hypotheses are
equally likely to be true, the optimal observer chooses an
alternative on the basis of the sign of the final log-likelihood ratio.
Therefore, Equation 6 can be simplified by ignoring the scaling
factor in front of the square bracket; as this scaling factor is positive
it does not change the sign of decision variable and the choices
made by the model. Furthermore, we divide the decision variable
by 1{q, which again does not change its sign. The resulting
decision variable is now:
DVT~
XqT
1
xi{
q
(1{q)
X(1{q)T
1
yi: ð9Þ
In Equation 9, the evidence sampled from Y is weighted by a
factor which depends on the relative time spent viewing the two
stimuli. Such relative weighting is not present in the standard
diffusion model that describes choice between two alternatives for
which evidence comes in simultaneously. The comparative nature
of the current problem results in the relative weights on the two
sources of evidence changing every time one particular source is
sampled. Such continuous adjustment of the weights may be
difficult to achieve computationally in a real biological system.
Therefore, we consider a simplified procedure for updating the
decision variable that does not involve changing the weights of
accumulated evidence over time. Under some specific circum-
stances, this procedure still results in exactly the same value of
decision variable at the end of the available time T and hence the
same choice. Suppose the decision-maker aims to spend a certain
fraction of time on each alternative. In practice this may be
difficult to achieve exactly, but it seems plausible that the observer
has learned how much time is available overall, and how much
time is typically needed to get a reasonable estimate of the stimulus
property under consideration (e.g. motion direction). We denote
the target fraction of samples ~q. For example, observers might aim
to spend half the available time on each option, so that ~q~0:5. To
update Equation 9, the observer now uses the target fraction ~q
instead of the ‘‘true’’, evolving fraction q. As a result, the decision
variable is now updated as follows:
gDVtz1~gDVtzxt if X Observed
gDVtz1~gDVt{ ~q
(1{~q)
yt if Y Observed:
ð10Þ
Note that the decision variables of Equations 9 and 10 are equal if
q~~q. Thus if the actual allocation of samples matches the target
fraction, then at decision time T this simplified procedure results in
exactly the same decision variable as the ideal solution.
To illustrate the relationship between a decision variable with
variable weights (Equation 5) and one with fixed weights (Equation
10), we simulated runs of the two decision variables with identical
sequences of samples used for each (Figure 2). In the simulations of
the simplified decision variable, the weighting was based on a
target of sampling both alternatives equally (i.e. ~q~0:5) and the
points marked by black circles on the figure indicate the times
when this assumption holds (q~~q). At each of these points the
simplified decision variable is equal to the log-likelihood ratio
(marked by filled circles). At all other points the true sampling
allocation q differs from the assumed terminal value ~q and the
simplified decision variable differs from the log-likelihood.
Interestingly, the deviation is such that for these periods the
decision variable drifts toward the fixated alternative.
If the observer using Equation 10 allocated samples to the two
alternatives differently to the target fraction, so that ~q=q at the
end of sampling time, then the error rate increases (see Materials
S1, section 5). When ~q~0:5, the decision maker will be biased
towards choosing the alternative sampled for longer. Such an
influence of gaze time was demonstrated in the ‘‘consumer choice’’
paradigm of Krajbich et al [21], and was the basis for the
development of their fixation-dependent drift diffusion model. In
fact, for the specific case illustrated here with ~q~0:5, the
weighting factor in the bottom of Equation 6 equals 1. The
resulting decision process reduces to that proposed by Krajbich et
al. [21]. In our data there was no such bias for observers to choose
the pattern that had been sampled for longer. In the equal
coherence conditions, the chosen pattern was sampled for 51.3%
of the available time (averaged across observers). In the unequal
coherence conditions, the chosen pattern was sampled for 51.8%.
The small deviations from the equal sampling allocation amounted
to ,40 ms, but the proportional gaze times did not differ reliably
from 0.5 (one-sample t-tests, p..1).
Note that Equation 10 describes the temporal evolution of the
decision variable regardless of whether the observer manages to
match the target fraction ~q. In our view, it is not unreasonable to
assume that, after some experience on the decision task, observers
have some idea of how long they should spend sampling each
source of information (in the absence of any information about the
upcoming stimulus). The adoption of a certain value for ~q may be
seen as a heuristic that, while not optimal, typically results in a
decision variable that is reasonably close to optimal to enable
satisfactory performance. With prior knowledge about the quality
of the two information sources, it becomes – in principle – possible
to set a more appropriate value for ~q. Indeed, we have shown that
on single switch trials, fixation duration on the first source is
adjusted to the quality of the second, un-seen source under such
conditions (Figure 5c). On any one trial, however, there will be
other determinants of gaze time that influence how close the actual
allocation of time matches the target allocation. Some of these
other influences are discussed below.
Discussion
In this paper we studied a challenging decision problem in
which information from two different sources is sampled in order
to come to some overall decision about the ‘‘state’’ of the visual
world (for a recent, related development in the context of visual
search, see [26]). In the majority of studies on the neuroscience of
(perceptual) decision-making, a binary decision is made on the
basis of a single source of information that simultaneously provides
evidence for both alternatives [9,10]. The problem introduced in
this article goes beyond this simple situation in that (i) there is
limited time to sample different sources of information or options;
(ii) sources can only be sampled one at a time; (iii) the quality of
different sources may vary; (iv) the quality of the sources may not
be known beforehand; and (v) switching between sources incurs a
temporal cost. While the specific instantiation of the decision
problem was perceptual in nature, these characteristic features of
the problem are shared with more complex situations such as
economic decisions (e.g., choosing a consumer product based on
sampling user reviews), and different forms of animal behaviour
[27] (e.g., foraging in patchy environments; mate choice).
Given the novelty of the problem under consideration, as a
starting point we identified the optimal solution or ‘‘ideal
observer’’ [28]. We then placed human observers in a similar
decision situation and compared their behaviour with that of the
optimal observer. Finally, we developed a simplified, non-optimal
observer that does not require continuous adjustment of the
weights applied to evidence from the two sources. We showed that
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this simplified model contains the fixation-dependent drift-
diffusion model [21] as a special case. This model has been
developed recently to account for choice behaviour in a similar
decision problem that involved sampling non-stochastic options in
serial, under the assumption that both options were of equal
quality. In the remainder of the Discussion, we focus on the
comparison between optimal and human observers. In particular,
departures from the normative solution should tell us something
about the constraints faced by a real biological system in the
solution to this type of decision problem.
The most trivial prediction of the model is that noisier sources of
information should be sampled for longer and human observers
did exactly that (Figure 5a). A more specific prediction is that the
ratio of gaze time on low and high coherence patterns maps onto
the ratio of the standard deviation of these sources of information.
We did not have direct access to the stimulus noise, but we
inferred the ratio of the sensory variability from observers’
uncertainty about the direction of individual motion patterns
(measured separately). While these data were not in line with the
predicted identity correspondence, there was a clear correlation
between gaze time and the precision of the direction estimates
(Figure 6b). Furthermore, the optimal observer predicts that a
second switch (back to the first pattern) will be more likely if the
second pattern is of good quality, so that not all the remaining time
is needed for its analysis. The downward slopes in Figure 7 are
consistent with this prediction.
An important question concerns how observers know the quality
of a pattern or their direction estimate. For the patterns
themselves, with only two levels of noise it is relatively easy to
rapidly classify a pattern as ‘low noise’ or ‘high noise’. Observers
may simply know that noisier patterns result in less certain
direction estimates, or they may have learned a more precise
mapping during the experiment itself (or, indeed, during the
preliminary threshold estimation phase of the study). In terms of
an online mechanism that estimates the uncertainty while viewing a
particular pattern, it may be possible to monitor the stability of an
internal direction estimate over time. For example, large
fluctuations from time t to time t+n would indicate large variability.
The simplest mechanism would involve a simple comparison
between two (successive) time points; more complex mechanisms
would involve computing the second-order statistics over a
number of direction estimates from a larger temporal window.
It is clear that human behaviour departed from the norm in
several ways. First, even when given prior information, observers
often made more than one switch, whereas the ideal observer
would set just a single switch point. At the very least, we might
have expected the number of switches to be lower when prior
knowledge was available, but no overall reduction in the number
of switches was observed (Figure 7). Second, as stated above, for
the optimal observer the ratio of sampling or gaze times matches
the ratio of variability of the information sources. In our data,
however, the modulation of gaze time was much less than what
would be expected from the precision of the direction estimates
(Figure 6b). Third, the model predicts that when the noise of the
two information sources is equal, gaze time should be equal
regardless of coherence when the noise levels are known
beforehand. That is, gaze time on the first pattern in a trial with
two low coherence patterns should be equal to the gaze time on
the first pattern in a trial with two high coherence patterns.
Indeed, the model makes a stronger prediction that time should be
allocated equally to the two patterns within a trial in both of these
conditions. Neither prediction was supported in our data: gaze
time was longer on the low coherence pattern compared to the
high coherence pattern in the equal coherence trials (Figure 5a). In
addition, overall gaze time on the first pattern was generally
greater than half the available time. The latter result is mostly due
to re-fixations: on trials with just a single switch, gaze time on both
patterns was much more equally distributed (Figure 5c).
These departures from the optimal observer are not surprising:
the optimal observer is only driven by the quality of the
information on the current trial and has perfect memory of all
the information sampled. With prior knowledge, the optimal
observer switches only once, at a time that maximises the amount
of information gained from the two patterns. Without prior
knowledge, the optimal observer makes allowances for the un-
known quality of the second pattern. When the second pattern
turns out to be relatively easy to process, a further switch back to
the first pattern may occur. It is clear that our human observers
are influenced by other factors that are not directly linked to the
quality of the current stimulus. We will discuss some of these
factors separately for switch frequency and fixation timing.
Switch frequency
What triggers multiple switches in a trial? In particular, why
would observers go back to a pattern they have already sampled?
In the absence of prior knowledge, we described how it may be
advantageous to switch back if it turns out that the first switch left
more time than necessary for the analysis of the second pattern.
However, our observers switched back almost equally often when
prior information was available. It is of course plausible that the
efficacy with which that information is used fluctuates from trial-
to-trial. Furthermore, even when prior information is used
appropriately, the stochastic nature of the stimulus may make
one of the patterns more difficult to identify than expected, in
which case switching back to that pattern is appropriate. It is also
possible that observers sometimes switch back as a checking
operation in order to verify a preliminary decision, provided
sufficient time is available. Moreover, noise or errors in the timing
of the first switch may necessitate a further switch back to further
process the pattern that was processed too briefly the first time
around.
Finally, it is possible that when the observer switches to the
second source, the representation of the first pattern direction
degrades, perhaps due to passive decay or interference by the
currently sampled stimulus [29,30]. Decay and interference result
in a less certain estimate of the signal direction of the previously
sampled pattern [31]. An observer may then switch back to a
previously sampled source in order to compensate for this loss of
information. The model assumes that each sample contributes
equally to the perceptual decision – in other words, that there is
perfect memory. This assumption is most likely not valid for
human observers. If decay or interference occurs, earlier samples
effectively contribute less and the need for further switches
becomes more pressing.
Fixation timing
The factors listed above may influence switching behaviour and
thereby gaze time. Of course, gaze time is also directly influenced
by how long observers choose to fixate a given pattern. In this
domain too, it is likely that human observers are influenced by
factors other than the quality of the two patterns. In particular, it is
plausible that observers in a task like this develop an overall sense
of the total trial duration and the typical amount of time needed to
identify the direction of the two patterns with sufficient accuracy.
Indeed, on trials with a single switch – especially in the known
condition – observers spent approximately half the available time
on each pattern (Figure 5c). We take this finding to suggest that
observers have a good representation of the overall trial duration
Adaptive Sampling for Perceptual Decisions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e78993
and use this knowledge to ensure that approximately sufficient
time is available to process both patterns.
In drawing a link between the optimal observer and the fixation-
dependent drift diffusion model, we posited exactly such a
temporal representation (in the form of the target fraction of
samples allocated to a given source, ~q). For example, observers
may learn that most of the time, they feel reasonably confident
about their decision when they switch somewhere near the mid-
point of the trial. This strategy may then form the basis of their
sampling behaviour, with the specific properties of the stimulus on
any given trial only modulating this ‘‘default setting’’. As a result,
any modulation of the sampling allocation by the quality of the
information sources would be much more subtle than predicted on
the basis of the stimulus qualities alone. Note that some models of
eye movement control in reading [32,33] and scene perception
[34] incorporate the idea of a rhythmic timing mechanism that
paces movements of the eyes at a rate that is typically sufficient to
allow for adequate information uptake during individual fixations
[35].
Is sampling behaviour adaptive?
Given these departures from the norm, it is reasonable to ask
whether, and in what sense, sampling behaviour was adaptive at
all. Human data did not show a strong relationship between gaze
allocation and decision accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis (data not
shown). The absence of such a link between sampling and
accuracy most likely stems from the carefully titrated difficulty of
the discrimination task. That is, we may have set the directional
offset at such a level that relatively small variations in sampling
time are unlikely to generate drastic modulations in perceptual
accuracy. In our view, adaptive sampling means that the time
allocated to the available information sources reflects the
uncertainty in the global task environment, since the quality of all
information sources is relevant to good task performance.
In this paper, we have reported a number of effects that
demonstrate that the quality of multiple sources of information,
beyond the currently fixated source, influences the sampling
strategy. Even in the unknown condition of the present study, we
see an effect of the noise of the second source on the sampling time
of the first source. This effect is necessarily mediated by multiple
switches. As a result of these switches, the quality of both sources of
information influences the sampling time of the first pattern. When
we provide the observer with prior knowledge about the quality of
both information sources, the quality of the global task environ-
ment exerts a more pronounced effect on gaze time, the number of
switches, and even the timing of a single switch. We suggest that
these strategic adjustments to the quality of information in the
global task environment are the hallmark of adaptive sampling.
Methods
Participants
Eight observers (5 females; age: 18–25) received money for
participation. All had normal vision or vision corrected by contact
lenses. Participants provided written consent before testing began,
and once more after testing had been completed and they were
debriefed. The experimental work was approved by the University
of Bristol Faculty of Science Human Research Ethics Committee
and complied with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a 210 Viewsonic G225fB monitor
with 10246768 resolution at 85 Hz and were generated by
custom-written software running in Matlab (The MathWorksLtd.)
using PsychToolbox 3.0.8 [36]. The position of one eye (typically
the right) was recorded at 1000 Hz using an Eyelink 2000 video-
based eye-tracker (SR Research Ltd.).
One RDK consisted of 100 white or black dots (squares of side
length 3 pixels <79) which moved within a circular aperture of
radius 4 deg on a mid-grey background, giving a mean dot density
of 2 dots deg22. The dot patterns moved according to a ‘Brownian
Motion’ algorithm [37]: On each frame, a subset of dots were
chosen as signal dots and translated in the signal direction and the
remaining (noise) dots were given random directions from the
interval [0,360), but moved at the same speed. Each dot moved at
6 deg s21, being translated ,49 on each frame. RDK animations
were independently produced for each trial for each participant.
The two coherences (proportions of signal dots) used throughout
the experiment were 0.12 and 0.24. In the main experiment, a
‘‘standard’’ direction was chosen randomly from the interval
[0,360) and assigned this to either the top or bottom pattern. The
other pattern then moved in the standard direction 6 the
directional offset determined by the preliminary measurement of
the directional discrimination threshold.
Threshold estimation
Participants sat at a desk and viewed the computer screen,
constrained by chin and forehead rests, from a distance of 57 cm.
After the presentation of the fixation cross for 800 ms, two RDKs
of the same coherence were presented sequentially in the centre of
the screen for 600 ms each, separated by a 1 second inter-stimulus
interval. The participants’ task was to identify the target pattern:
the one whose signal direction was further clockwise through the
short angle (no trials involved the signal directions differing by
more than 80 deg). They signalled their decision with a keypad
after the second pattern had offset. Trials began automatically
after a delay of 750 ms following the response to the previous trial
being registered. Observers were given auditory feedback on their
performance (high tone – correct, low tone – error).
In order to obtain threshold directions for each level of
coherence, two staircases were implemented using the QUEST
algorithm [38,39]. QUEST sequentially updates a posterior
probability density function (pdf) of the threshold location based
on a psychometric function with specified slope (determined by a
pilot study using the method of constants), chance and lapse-rate
parameters. It then suggests the angle of the next trial at the
median of the posterior pdf. Finally, QUEST estimates the 75%
threshold at the mean of the posterior pdf. Staircases were run
concurrently, with trials from each staircase randomly intermixed.
QUEST’s suggestions for the next trial angle were always
implemented. The session began with between 30 and 60 practice
trials in which participants could familiarise themselves with the
paradigm. Each staircase consisted of 80 trials making a threshold
estimation block of 160 trials with two scheduled breaks.
The average of the two thresholds was used as the directional
offset between the two patterns in the main comparative direction
discrimination task. By setting the directional offset in this manner
we ensured that: (i) the overall difficulty of the main comparative
task was titrated appropriately for each individual observer; and (ii)
the variation in coherence did indeed correspond to a variation in
the quality of the internal, sensory evidence; that is, with a much
larger directional offset, the coherence of the patterns would have
mattered much less.
Single pattern direction estimation
Observers also performed a task in which they viewed single
patterns presented at fixation for a variable duration. Six durations
(75, 125, 250, 500, 750, 1000 ms) were crossed with the 2
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coherences (.12 and .24) to create 12 experimental conditions. A
13th condition consisted of 100% coherence for 1000 ms.
Observers viewed the RDK and then indicated their estimate of
its signal direction using an onscreen arrow positioned with a
mouse (see Figure 4b). For each trial, a mid-grey background was
used with the polarity of the dots (black or white) chosen
randomly. Each condition was repeated 55 times, for a total of
715 trials, performed over one hour with three breaks.
For each trial, we recorded the angular difference between the
true direction of motion and the estimated direction of motion.
Inspection of individual observers’ errors as a function of the true
direction revealed no consistent biases. The circular standard
deviation was computed using the ‘CircStat’ toolbox [25] for
Matlab (The Mathworks, Inc). The particular metric we opted for
was the angular deviation, which can range from 0 to
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
(inclusive) radians [0u–81u]. This particular metric generally gives
somewhat lower estimates of the variability than the regular
standard deviation that does not take the circularity of the data
into account. However, our specific inferences from the analysis
presented in Figure 6 do not depend on exactly which metric we
select.
Comparative decision task
A block of trials started with a calibration of the eye tracker,
using a nine-point grid. A subsequent validation was used to
ensure the consistency of the calibration (mean difference #.5
deg). Each trial began with a central fixation cross. Once this was
successfully fixated, the experimenter started the trial. Immediately
two stationary RDKs appeared, centred 5.8 deg above and below
the centre of the screen on the vertical axis. After 500 ms the
fixation cross was extinguished and replaced with an arrow
pointing either up or down (with equal probability). The arrow
was displayed for 500 ms, and its offset was the cue for observers
to fixate the cued pattern. Given the fixed duration of the cue, its
offset was frequently anticipated by observers; however, the fixated
pattern would only start moving after the 500 ms cue period was
over. In the ‘known’ condition the luminance (i.e. black or white)
of the RDK mapped onto the coherence (the mapping was
counterbalanced between participants). In this condition the
duration of the cross and arrow gave observers 1 second in which
to process the RDK polarities. In the ‘unknown’ condition, the
mapping was random; that is, each RDK was randomly drawn
with black or white dots.
Participants had to fixate at least 1.8 deg vertically above the
screen centre before the upper RDK moved and the same distance
below the centre for the lower pattern. This gaze contingency was
produced using real-time gaze position information from the eye-
tracker, taking into account the vertical component only.
Participants were free to actively sample the patterns over a
period of 1500 ms. At this point, the patterns disappeared and
participants signalled whether the top or bottom pattern moved in
a direction that was ‘‘more clockwise’’. They were instructed that
they must look at each pattern at least once in the course of a trial
(indeed, the task was impossible without sampling both patterns)
but other than that, they could switch between patterns in any way
they wanted.
After 10–20 practice trials to familiarise themselves with the
main comparative task, participants performed 24 blocks of 64
trials over 4 experimental sessions: 12 blocks in each of the
‘known’ and ‘unknown’ conditions. The ‘known’ and ‘unknown’
conditions were alternated between blocks within a session; the
order was counterbalanced across observers. A block consisted of
16 trials for each combination of the two coherence levels.
Participants were allowed breaks between blocks. The whole study
was performed in six one-hour sessions on different days, in the
following order: threshold estimation, comparative decision 1,
comparative decision 2, single pattern direction estimation,
comparative decision 3, comparative decision 4.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Division of sampling time for varying com-
binations of high and low noise stimuli for instanta-
neous switching decision problems. In Panel (a) the
timelines show the division of sampling time between the sources
of stimuli for the four possible combinations of high and low noise
stimuli with the noise of both sources known a priori. In each
timeline we show the simplest single switch strategy, the timing of
the switch is indicated by the vertical line, with alternative X
observed from time 0 to the switching point and alternative Y
observed thereafter until the trial ends at time T. In Panel (b) the
timelines show the range of times in which the optimal first
switching point lies when the noise level of stimulus Y is unknown.
Unlike the known variance case, the exact location of the optimal
first switching point depends on not only the two possible noise
levels but also depends on the total sampling time available and
2d, the difference in the response to the stimuli.
(TIFF)
Figure S2 Plots comparing the argument of the DV
(blue lines) and LLR (red lines) error functions across
the interval of valid sampling strategies [0, 1] under a
number of parameterisations of the decision problem.
In each plot the optimal sampling strategy q~ sxsxzsyis marked on
both the argument and derivative plots. Plots have been generated
with mHigh~3:0, mLow~1:0, mHigh~2:0, mLow~1:0 and T~10.
From left to right the variances of the alternatives vary in each of
the plots with Figures 2(a) and 2(d) having sx~sHighand
sy~sLow, Figures 2(b) and 2(e) having sx~sy~sHigh, and in
Figures 2(c) and 2(f) sx~sLow and sy~sHigh. From top to bottom
the means of the alternatives vary with Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c)
having mx~mHigh and my~mLow and Figures 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f)
having mx~mLow and my~mHigh. Comparing the DV and LLR
plots it can be seen that, as expected, the two values are coincident
at q~ sxsxzsy. Furthermore, from inspection of the DV argument
plot (blue line), it can be seen that as the plot is a straight line, the
derivative has a constant value across [0, 1].
(TIFF)
Material S1 Adaptive sampling of information in per-
ceptual decision-making.
(PDF)
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